International Legislation 
and Administration 



By 

ALPHEUS HENRY SNOW 



American Peace Society 
Washington, D. C. 
1917 


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International Legislation 
and Administration 

By 

ALPHEUS HENRY SNOW 


An address delivered May 29, 1917, at the National Con¬ 
ference on the Foreign Relations of the United States, 
held at Long Beach, N. Y., May 28 to June 1, 
1917, under the auspices of the Academy of 
Political Science in the City of New York. 


(Reprinted from the Advocate of Peace for July, 1917.) 


With an Appendix 

Containing the Documents referred to in the text. 


American Peace Society 
Colorado Building, Washington, D. C. 
1917 
































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INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 
AND ADMINISTRATION 


By ALPHEUS HENRY SNOW 


A survey of international politics discloses two great 
facts. The first is, that the nations have always 
refused to consider any plan for instituting an interna¬ 
tional government endowed with physical force. The 
second is, that the nations, by the Hague Convention for 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,* ratified by 
practically all of them, besides establishing the judicial 
part of an international organization, legitimized and 
recommended international conciliation of disputant or 
belligerent nations by any nation not engaged in the 
dispute, through good offices and mediation, and also 
recommended the institution of commissions of inquiry 
b}^ disputant nations to settle the dispute as agencies of 
international conciliation. 

This second fact is of profound importance; for the 
Convention for Pacific Settlement is, so far as it goes, 
a written constitution of the society of nations. By it 
the united nations instituted an international judicial 
organ—the Permanent Court of Arbitration,—and cer¬ 
tain administrative organs ancillary to the court—the 
Permanent Administrative Council and the Interna¬ 
tional Bureau. By it mediating nations, and commis¬ 
sions of inquiry instituted by disputant nations, were 
recognized as international conciliative agencies in the 
particular case. By it the processes of action of these in¬ 
ternational agencies and organs were prescribed. By the 
Draft Convention for a Judicial Arbitration Courtf— 
otherwise called the Permanent Court of Arbitral Jus¬ 
tice—the second Hague Conference instituted an addi¬ 
tional international organ and prescribed its processes; 
and when the nations agree concerning the manner of 
selecting the judges of this new international court and 


* See Appendix A, p. 23. 
f See Appendix B, p. 39. 






-1 


I INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 


i 

thus put the Draft Convention into effect, the Draft 
Convention will in fact form an additional part of the 
Convention for Pacific Settlement. The Convention 
for Pacific Settlement is, however, an incomplete writ¬ 
ten constitution, because it fails to institute any inter¬ 
national legislative organs or processes whatever, and 
because the administrative organs instituted by it, being 
only ancillary to the judicial organ, are inadequate for 
general international administrative purposes. In spite 
of the incompleteness and inadequacy of the Convention 
for Pacific Settlement, however, the fact that it exists, 
as the substantially unanimous act of all nations, is 
perhaps the most momentous circumstance in human 
history. When the substantially unanimous ratification 
of this Convention was completed, in the summer of 
1907, the nations ceased to be a mere unorganized com¬ 
munity, and became an organized voluntary and coop¬ 
erative society and union for judicial purposes—a Ver- 
band* as the German writers' describe it, or a consocia¬ 
tion, as we might call it. 

The nations were not ready, at the time of the Hague 
Conferences, to consider the question of an improved 
arrangement for international legislation and adminis¬ 
tration. It was not even discussed in 1899 or in 1907. 
The ten years that have nearly elapsed since the second 
Hague Conference have, however, been years of wonder¬ 
ful development and progress. This universal war has 
clarified many things that before were unseen or seen 
only darkly. The question of making an improvement 
in international legislation and administration is now 
one of practical politics. It is clear that such an im¬ 
provement must occur through the amendment and re¬ 
vision of the Convention for Pacific Settlement so as to 
add to it the proper institutions for international legis¬ 
lation and administration, consistent with the existing 
judicial, administrative, and conciliative institutions 
established by it and conforming to the general spirit 
of the Convention and the fundamental principles on 
which it is based. 

. , T1 |? ^st Question is, ought an international admin¬ 
istrative body to be itself empowered to use physical 


* ^ ee Dcr Staatenverband 
Professor Walther Schticking 
published in 1912. 


der Haager Konferenzen, by 
of the University of Marburg, 



AND ADMINI STRAIN ON 


S 


force to control the nations; that is to say, ought a 
physical-force international government to be instituted 
by the nations to govern them for the common purposes ? 
If the nations delegate to a physical-force government 
the power to govern them, they must also delegate to it 
the power to tax for the common purposes and the power 
to raise, support, and wield an international army, navy, 
and police. The power to tax, as has been well said, 
is the power to destroy. 

The question whether a physical-force international 
government is politically practicable as tending to just 
government almost answers itself in the negative, since 
all the nations have persistently, unanimously, and re¬ 
cently refused even to consider such a form of govern¬ 
ment. Yet, as such an international government is ad¬ 
vocated by many, it will be desirable to analyze the 
reasons why it is impracticable and to satisfy ourselves 
that these reasons are permanent and unchangeable. 

All plans for such an international government fall 
in one of three classes: They are plans for international 
government by one nation; or by a league of nations; 
or by a body of men delegated by the nations, with 
power to raise, support, and wield an international 
army, navy, and police. An international government 
consisting of one nation would be necessarily autocratic, 
since a nation is necessarily endowed with physical force 
and cannot be legally limited. The only limitations 
upon the powers of a nation which are possible are self¬ 
limitations imposed by the nation upon itself, which, 
from the standpoint of political science, are no limita¬ 
tions. Moreover, the only nation which could, as a mat¬ 
ter of practical politics, be the constituted international 
autocrat would be one which was already the de facto 
international autocrat by reason of its control of the 
seas, the international trade routes, and the regions in¬ 
habited by weak or backward peoples, and which was so 
favorably located as to be able successfully to weaken 
all its rivals by playing as sure winner in the diplomatic 
and military game of the balance of power. 

A league of nations is, like a nation, endowed with 
physical force and is incapable of constitutional limita¬ 
tions ; and if such a league were to institute itself as the 
international government, it would have to be, already, 
collectively, the de facto international autocrat. There 


6 


INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 


being no possibility of constitutional limitation either 
as respects the internal or the external relations of the 
league, it would necessarily develop an invisible govern¬ 
ment of its own, which would be the autocrat of the 
league and of the world. This invisible government 
would necessarily be a body of men, or the one nation 
which at the moment happened to be the de facto and 
actual autocrat of the world. 

If the nations without disarming were to appoint a 
body of persons with governmental powers for the com¬ 
mon purposes, and endow this body with physical fbrce, 
the result would be to increase the possibilities of war 
without establishing an efficient international govern¬ 
ment. If the nations were to disarm and delegate pow¬ 
ers of government for the common purposes to a body of 
persons, at the same time endowing this body with 
physical force, they would destroy themselves as nations 
and become states of a universal federal state. Such 
self-abnegation on the part of the nations, if conceiv¬ 
able as a matter of practical politics, would, however, be 
of no avail, since a federal state thus established would 
be found to be inefficient as a means of preserving inter¬ 
national order and peace. 

The federal state, if attempted to be applied where 
the requisites for its operation do not exist, establishes 
an autocracy of a majority necessarily ignorant of its 
own needs or the needs of the minority, which is the 
worst and most hopeless of all autocracies. The two 
requisites for the successful existence of a federal state 
have been proved to be, first, that it shall include a terri¬ 
tory every part of which is contiguous with every other 
part or is so situated and populated that it may be re¬ 
garded as appurtenant for political purposes; second, 
that it shall contain a population which is highly civil¬ 
ized and homogeneous, and which is under an economic 
pressure to cooperate as an economic unit. Where these 
two conditions do not exist, the federated states and peo¬ 
ples are necessarily ignorant of the local conditions of 
each other and are swayed by their local interests, so 
that the majority vote of their representatives is neces¬ 
sarily determined by the play of the local interests 
against each other. Such a situation means either gov¬ 
ernment by an assembly which is autocratic through 
ignorance or an invisible government which is autocratic 


AND ADMINISTRATION 


1 


as being without constitutional limitations. On account 
of the realization of this danger of the federal-state plan 
of government, if extended beyond the regions in which 
the necessary conditions exist, the proposal for convert¬ 
ing the British Empire into a federal state, promoted by 
the Imperial Federation League from 1885 to 1895, was 
rejected by the people of Great Britain and by the people 
of the British dominions, colonies, and dependencies. 
For the same reason the people of the United States re¬ 
jected the proposal to incorporate the Philippines into 
an enlarged American federal state. Taking the world 
together, with its diverse nations and peoples, the condi¬ 
tions for uniting the nations and their peoples into a 
federal state are not only lacking at the present time, 
but undoubtedly for all time to come. 

If, therefore, the nations were to attempt to institute 
any kind of international government endowed with 
physical force, they would inevitably be instituting an 
international autocracy. It would be indispensable that 
in any constitution of the society of nations there should 
be an express constitutional prohibition denying physical 
force to any part of the organization—legislative, ad¬ 
ministrative, or judicial—and also a prohibition deny¬ 
ing the power of taxation in any form or under any 
guise whatever, since a body which can tax can endow 
itself with physical force. 

The object of these prohibitions would be, however, 
only to prevent the international body delegated by the 
nations from becoming autocratic, and it would doubt¬ 
less be needful that it should exercise certain interna¬ 
tional police powers in certain exceptional cases. There¬ 
fore it would be necessary to provide, by way of excep¬ 
tion, that these prohibitions should not prevent the na¬ 
tions from making grants to the international body, by 
special international agreements, of police or taxing 
power, or both, within international areas or interna¬ 
tionalized districts designated by these international 
agreements, where the local circumstances were such 
that it would be certain that resistance would be made 
to the international police only by individuals or by 
small unorganized bodies of individuals. 

But though thus substantially deprived of physical 
force, the international body which any constitution of 
the society of nations must necessarily institute of course 


8 


INTERNATIONAL LEGISTATION 


must not be deprived of force, since all government in¬ 
volves the use of force. It could be, and undoubtedly 
ought to be, endowed with persuasive force. Persuasion 
is a force which is utilizable, and every day utilized, with 
increasing effectiveness, by all governments, but which, 
like all forces, has the possibility of use for good or. for 
evil. An international body delegated by the nations 
could use persuasion to induce the nations either to co¬ 
operate in order and peace, or to compete with each 
other in disorder and war. By controlling the physical 
force of some of the nations it could terrorize and en¬ 
slave other nations or produce interminable war and 
anarchy. Such a power must be carefully safeguarded 
by constitutional limitation, so that it may be effective 
and yet not dangerous. 

The international body, in order to be effective, must 
exercise scientifically organized, informed, and applied 
persuasion. This implies conciliation by expert, in¬ 
formed, and aggressive action. It must not sit still and 
wait for the nations to ask it to act. It must investigate 
and inform itself, must formulate counsel on the facts 
discovered by investigation, and must do everything 
proper to induce the nations to accept and follow its 
counsel. A body endowed with the power of concilia¬ 
tion uses real force and superior force, for it uses psychi¬ 
cal force; and psychical force, being the creator, user, 
and destroyer of physical force, is necessarily superior 
and major force. 

The international conciliative body, in order to be ef¬ 
fective, must be pervasive. It must therefore have in 
each nation a permanent branch or delegation. Doubt¬ 
less the international body would appoint the members 
of each national delegation, subject to confirmation by 
the nation through its executive government or its legis¬ 
lature. Doubtless, also, the members of each national 
delegation would be removable by the international 
body. 

The international conciliative body, in order to be 
effective, must be armed by the nations with the weapon 
of publicity, so that it may create and wield, or correct, 
public sentiment in favor of its righteous counsel. The 
power to publish its counsel and support it by statement 
of facts and by argument might, and probably would, 


AND ADMINISTRATION 


9 


require that it should be granted a means of publication 
controlled by itself. 

The international body, in order not to be dangerous, 
must use its power of persuasion exclusively for concil¬ 
iation to induce cooperation. It must appeal to self- 
interest, seen in light of the interests of all concerned. 
There must be an entire absence of threats, secret 
pressure, or other form of terrorization. Partisan poli¬ 
tics must never be allowed to influence its personnel or 
work, or that of its delegation in any nation. Its inde¬ 
pendence and impartiality must be absolute and should 
be jealously prized and guarded by the people. 

It should be impossible in the future for any confer¬ 
ences to be held when secret treaties exist affecting the 
objects discussed, unknown not only to the nationals of 
the countries involved, but to the very parliaments them- 
seelves, as has been the case in the past. The funda¬ 
mental work of the international body must be, through 
its delegation in each nation, to instruct the people—the 
masses of the people—concerning the international 
status, the situation of their own nation, the attitude of 
their own national administration towards international 
affairs and the reasons for and against it, as clearly and 
definitely as is compatible with the public interest; so 
that public opinion, instead of being swayed by igno¬ 
rance, by prejudice, or by local self-interest, will be 
sound and enlightened and a source of strength in any 
crisis. 

Conciliation necessarily involves the acceptance and 
promulgation of democracy, republicanism, and coopera¬ 
tion ; that is, in a word, the two Great Commandments 
of the New Testament. It implies government by con¬ 
sent, since conciliation by the government and consent 
by the governed are correlative. The philosophy which 
it must inevitably act upon and inculcate, if it acts 
logically, is the philosophy of cooperation—that each 
man and each nation can gain more by voluntarily co¬ 
operating with all others in utilizing the forces of nature 
for human development and by participating equitably 
in the common product, than is possible by isolated or 
competitive action. 

The principle of conciliative direction of the interna¬ 
tional acts and relations of nations by international 
agencies is the fundamental principle on which the Con- 


INTERNATIONAL LEGISTATION 


10 

vention for Pacific Settlement is based. The first part of 
that Convention is devoted to “good offices and media¬ 
tion”; the second to “arbitration.” “Good offices and 
mediation” are merely diplomatic terms to express two 
processes of the whole process of international concilia¬ 
tion. Though the Convention, as has been said, creates 
no general international agency of international concil¬ 
iation, nevertheless, by its legitimation and approval 
of good offices and mediation by one nation as respects 
disputes between other nations, and by its recommenda¬ 
tion to disputant nations to institute commissions of in¬ 
quiry for the settlement of the dispute as international 
conciliative agencies, it recognizes international concil¬ 
iation as a proper and feasible means of directing inter¬ 
national action. The establishment of means for 
international legislation and administration by concilia¬ 
tion, therefore, would not require that the nations 
should accept a new principle. It would only be the 
carrying out to its logical conclusion a principle which 
they have already accepted. The problem of bringing 
about efficient international legislation and administra¬ 
tion is that of formulating a scheme of international 
legislation and administration based on the accepted 
principle of international conciliation, which shall be 
acceptable to the nations as being for their general and 
particular self-interest, and of fitting this scheme into 
the present scheme of international adjudication and 
national conciliation established by the Convention for 
Pacific Settlement, so as to expand that Convention into 
a complete written constitution of the society of nations. 

The proper organs of an international political body 
for effecting international legislation and administration 
by conciliation would, it seems, not be a legislature and 
an executive exactly in the sense in which we use these 
terms, but would resemble what in our large civic asso¬ 
ciations and our business trusts (and, indeed, in nearly 
all associations of a purely voluntary and cooperative 
character) we call an executive committee and a general 
committee. The body corresponding to an executive 
committee might be called the ordinary international 
directorate, and the one corresponding to a general com¬ 
mittee the superintending international directorate. 
The ordinary directorate would, through its members, 
aided by such subordinate committees and expert assist- 


AND ADMINISTRATION 


li 


ants as might be found necessary, and by the local dele¬ 
gations in each nation, do the continuous administra¬ 
tive work of conciliation—making investigation of facts, 
formulating its counsel on the facts as ascertained, and 
doing everything proper, short of using physical force, 
to induce the adoption of the counsel by the national 
governments concerned. The superintending direct¬ 
orate, meeting occasionally or periodically, would, as 
chief administrative, superintend the administrative ac¬ 
tion of the ordinary directorate by formulating different 
counsel in particular cases, and would also act legisla¬ 
tively by laying down general rules applicable to general 
classes of international activities. These general rules 
would be primarily for the guidance of the ordinary 
directorate in its conciliative work. Incidentally they 
would be for the guidance of the nations and their 
peoples in the classes of international activities to which 
the rules would relate. 

The ordinary directorate would doubtless be more 
effective if it were to be an appointive body. The mem¬ 
bers might be appointed by a body corresponding to the 
Permanent Administrative Council established by the 
Hague Conferences, or by the superintending directorate. 
The superintending directorate would doubtless be most 
efficient if it were to be a representative body. The sys¬ 
tem adopted in the United States of having a Senate 
and House of Representatives, the one representing the 
nations as equals and the other representing districts 
of equal population, would seem to be applicable. 

The composition of the membership of the directorates 
would be a matter of prime importance. There would 
doubtless need to be stringent rules determining the eli¬ 
gibility of persons to membership in either directorate, 
particularly in the ordinary directorate. The use of 
conciliation as a governing force, so as efficiently to 
direct the action of masses of men, by their own con¬ 
sent, into activities which are to their self-interest and 
also are to the interest of all, is expert work of the high¬ 
est character. ISTo one should be eligible to such an 
official station who is not naturally endowed with great 
intellect and conscientiousness and who has not added 
as much as possible to his natural powers by education, 
by study and research, by travel enlightened by knowl¬ 
edge of languages, and by actual experience in govern¬ 
ment. 


12 


INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 


Under an international conciliative directorate, inter¬ 
national legislation would be effected, as at present, by 
the conventional enactments of conferences of all na¬ 
tions ratified by the separate nations, or by the fixation 
of international custom through coinciding treaty and 
diplomatic action of many nations; but, in addition, it 
would be effected by the general rules laid down by the 
superintending directorate for the guidance of the ordi¬ 
nary directorate, by the ordinary directorate in follow¬ 
ing its own precedents of counsel, and by uniform 
national legislation and treaty action respecting inter¬ 
national matters, this uniformity being brought about 
by the conciliative action of the international directorate. 
Each nation would be regarded as having not only ex¬ 
clusive powers of government within its own borders and 
over its own purely internal activities, and over all its 
citizens and corporations as respects their international 
activities, but also concurrent full powers of government 
with all other nations over the high seas, and concur¬ 
rent limited powers of government over the international 
trade routes, natural and artificial, and over all regions 
held as dependencies by any one nation. The interna¬ 
tional directorate and the national legislatures and 
treaty-making organs, acting uniformly in international 
affairs, would all together constitute the international 
legislature. International conferences for framing rules 
of international law, subject to ratification by the na¬ 
tions, might also be held, if deemed advisable. 

The international administration would be conducted 
by the two directorates and the executives of the differ¬ 
ent nations, the latter enforcing, each upon its own 
nationals and corporations, in a uniform manner rec¬ 
ommended by the international directorate, the inter¬ 
national legislation enacted in manner above described. 
The international administrative body would thus be 
composed of the international directorate and the par¬ 
ticular national executive engaged in enforcing a par¬ 
ticular act of international legislation. 

The present Permanent International Court of Arbi¬ 
tration, and the Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice 
already agreed to in principle by the second Hague 
Conference, would remain as the supreme judicial organs 
of the society of nations; their decisions being advisory 
and being reported by the respective courts to the 


AND ADMINI ST RAT I ON 


13 


ordinary international directorate, so that it might 
secure their enforcement through conciliation of the na¬ 
tions concerned. Doubtless in the long run international 
district courts would be established in correspondence 
with the Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice, each dis¬ 
trict comprising one large nation or a group of smaller 
nations. These district courts might have final jurisdic¬ 
tion in non-constitutional cases in which the rights in¬ 
volved were really those of individual nationals of differ¬ 
ent nations, subject to certiorari from the Permanent 
Court of Arbitral Justice. The Permanent Court of 
Arbitral Justice might have appellate jurisdiction over 
the district courts in constitutional cases between indi¬ 
vidual nationals of different nations and exclusive juris¬ 
diction in suits between nations involving strictly na¬ 
tional rights as distinct from the rights of individual 
nationals. The nations would, of course, remain at lib¬ 
erty to settle their disputes by arbitration conducted by 
arbiters of their own choice, if they saw fit. 

The primary power which would need to be delegated 
to the international directorate would be the power to 
bring about, through conciliation applied to national 
governments so as to induce uniform national legisla¬ 
tion and treaty action, the internationalization and free¬ 
dom of the high seas and of the international trade 
routes, including international railroads, canals, straits, 
sounds, and rivers. This would involve a conciliative 
direction of international trade, finance, intercourse, 
and migration. Power might also be delegated to the 
international directorate to bring about, by the same 
conciliative action, a more or less complete intemation- 
ization of backward countries held as dependencies of 
separate nations, such internationalization to be effected 
by each nation holding dependencies adopting a more 
or less open-door policv, determined in each case by the 
local circumstances of the particular dependency, as 
respects concessions for internal improvements and 
for carrying on manufacturing, mining, trade, trans¬ 
portation, banking, etc., in these countries; the ultimate 
goal being the equalization of economic opportunity 
among all the nations. 

The exceptional cases in which the police and taxing 
power, or the police power alone, might properly be 
granted to the international directorate would, it seems, 


14 


INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 


be of three kinds: First, if a district were provided as the 
seat of international direction, the international direct¬ 
orate would necessarily have the power of local police 
and local taxation within the district; second, if the high 
seas, as an international area by reason of being the com¬ 
mon property of all nations, were to be freed from na¬ 
tional naval vessels, as the result of destructive inven¬ 
tions and the successful working of the international 
directorate, the international directorate might be 
granted authority to patrol the sea routes for police pur¬ 
poses; and, third, if zones or districts bordering on 
straits, canals, or rivers were internationalized by special 
international agreement, the international directorate 
might be granted authority to maintain a police patrol 
within the internationalized zone or district. 

The whole directorate, composed of the ordinary di¬ 
rectorate and the superintending directorate, together 
with the international courts—which might be called 
the general international directorate—would be finan¬ 
cially supported in the same manner as is the present 
international body located at The Hague. The Con¬ 
vention for Pacific Settlement provides that the ex¬ 
penses of the present Hague organization “shall be borne 
by the signatory powers in the proportion fixed for the 
International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.” 
The Convention establishing the Universal Postal Union 
actually fixes the proportions to be paid. Doubtless no 
better system could be devised at the present time. 

The safeguards around the international directorate 
would be, primarily, the substantial denial of power to 
use physical force, which would carry with it a denial 
of general taxing power; secondarily, the requirement 
that in its action it should deal exclusively with the 
national governments; that it should use conciliation 
and persuasion exclusively; that it should be composed 
of experts and superintending experts; that it should 
have a specific sphere of powers relating to the seas as 
the common property of all nations, to the international 
trade routes as subject to the common use of all nations, 
and to the colonies and dependencies as subject to a 
qualified common use by all nations; and, thirdly, the 
provision that it should never be reduced to the neces¬ 
sity of begging money from the nations or asking pro¬ 
tection from any nation, but should he assured, in ad- 


AND ADMINISTRATION 


15 


vance and permanently, by an agreement of all nations, 
an adequate and dignified support, and perhaps also an 
appropriate seat of international direction exclusively 
governed by itself. 

It is incumbent on the United States to see to it, so 
far as may be in its power, that no international direct¬ 
orate is ever established except under a written constitu¬ 
tion delegating carefully limited powers and ratified by 
all, or at least two-thirds, of the nations, and that the 
written constitution shall be plainly such on its face— 
not merely in substance, but also in form. It is incum¬ 
bent also upon the United States to see to it that this 
; constitution shall contain a plain and distinct recogni¬ 
tion of the universal and fundamental principles which 
lie at the basis of all orderly and peaceful society. The 
insistence of Americans on written constitutions is not 
a mere American idiosyncrasy. Written constitutions 
are a vital and essential part of the American system, 
regarded as a universal system. By the Declaration of 
Independence* the American people committed them¬ 
selves to maintenance of the proposition, as a universal 
and self-evident truth, that all men are equally the 
creatures of a common Creator, and that there are there¬ 
fore certain rights of every human being, of which he 
cannot by his own action deprive himself, which arise 
from the nature of man as a spiritual being and from 
the equal endowment of each man by his Creator with 
the attributes of life, the will to live, and the desire for 
happiness, which are common to all; so that these funda¬ 
mental and universal rights exist antecedent to and 
independent of any government, however great and 
powerful. This fundamental and necessary limitation 
upon the power of all governments requires recognition 
by all governments through a written constitution; and 
since all the subordinate rights of individuals established 
by governments must be derived from and be consistent 
with these fundamental rights, written constitutions are 
also necessary in order to enable the people governed so 
to frame their government, and so to limit and safe¬ 
guard it, by general declarations, by specifications of 
powers, and by prohibitions, that it will certainly respect 
and secure the fundamental principles which underlie 
all human society and the fundamental rights of indi- 


See Appendix C, p. If. 



16 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 

viduals and nations based on these fundamental prin¬ 
ciples. 

Therefore it would be necessary that the written con¬ 
stitution of the society of nations establishing the inter¬ 
national directorate should contain a declaration of the 
universal and fundamental principles of all human ac¬ 
tion and relationship, such as is contained in the first 
sentence of the second paragraph of the preamble of the 
Declaration of Independence :* * * § a declaration of the fun¬ 
damental rights and duties of nations, f such as that 
which has been adopted by the American Institute of 
International Law and the American Peace Society; a 
declaration of the objects of the constitution, modeled 
upon the preamble of the Constitution of the United 
States ;X and also, if possible—after the provisions insti¬ 
tuting the different parts of the international directorate, 
defining their composition and the relations of one to the 
other, and determining the sphere of jurisdiction of the 
whole directorate and each of its parts by a specification 
of powers—a bill of rights, § democratizing and repub- 
licanizing the relations between the government of each 
nation and the people of the nation by establishing pro¬ 
hibitions, absolute or conditional, upon certain forms of 
governmental action found by experience to be uni¬ 
versally injurious or destructive to liberty. 

The institution of such an international directorate as 
has been above proposed would not disturb any of the 
existing agencies or processes by which international 
activities and relations are now directed. The nations 
would retain their ministries of foreign affairs, their 
ministries in charge of dependencies, their diplomatic 
and consular officers, and their courts functioning in in¬ 
ternational cases. The judicial tribunals and the ad¬ 
ministrative arrangements ancillary to them, established 
by the Hague Conferences, would be unchanged. Upon 
the present international mechanism the international 
directorate would be superposed, as a means of bringing 
all the existing agencies and processes into cooperation 
and harmony. 

The international directorate proposed would be but 


* See Appendix C, p. 47. 

t See Appendix D, p. 48. 

t See Appendix E, p. 50. 

§ See Appendix F, p. 51. 



AND ADMINISTRATION 


17 


an application on a universal scale of the system which 
nearly all nations having dependencies have found nec¬ 
essary in the management of their colonial empires. 
The Privy Council and the Council for India in Great 
Britain, and the Colonial Councils of the European na¬ 
tions, which under the ministries for the colonies and 
dependencies manage the colonial empires of these re¬ 
spective nations, are in principle interstate directorates, 
holding together widely separated countries, diverse in 
race, climate, and civilization, by methods which are 
essentially conciliative. Though these interstate direct¬ 
orates are backed by the physical force of the nation, 
physical force has been found to be inapplicable in hold¬ 
ing* dependencies to nations except when used sparingly 
and scientifically in aid of conciliation, and in many 
cases to be wholly inapplicable. The superintending 
directorate in colonial empires is in process of evolution, 
and in one or more of them will doubtless soon he a fact. 
The problem of holding together the widely separated 
nations of the world, diverse in race, climate, and civili¬ 
zation, is clearly analogous to the problem of managing 
colonial empires. The only difference is that the inter¬ 
national directorate must be a delegated body, instituted 
by all the nations, which shall be of and for them all, 
and shall carry the principles of democracy and repub¬ 
licanism into international relations.* 

The plan proposed would, of course, not be a panacea 
for all international ills. Each nation would continue 
to be free and independent. It would reject or accept 
the counsel of the international directorate according as 
it thought its self-interest demanded. Secret treaties 
and other forms of intrigue and excessive national arma¬ 
ments to support the intrigues, would doubtless continue 
to go on. Domination of the seas, the international 
trade routes, and the backward countries by individual 
nations or by a league or leagues of nations, would, no 
doubt, continue to be attempted. Invisible international 
government, in democracies and monarchies, would un- 


* Cf. The A dministration of Dependencies, by the author 
of this article, pp. 527-530, 57S-604, as respects the manage¬ 
ment of colonial empires by directive councils and superin¬ 
tending directive bodies, and the applicability of the direct¬ 
orate form of government in political aggregations where 
the federal-state form is inapplicable. 



18 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 

doubtedly continue to be the dream of political, finan¬ 
cial, and trading syndicates, and to have a more or less 
stable de facto existence. Attempts would probably be 
made to pervert the international directorate to selfish 
national ends. Therefore war would continue to be pos¬ 
sible. But a means would have been provided for the 
gradual abolition of all these abnormal processes and 
agencies and for the limitation, by the free act of the 
separate nations, of the excessive national armaments 
which make these abnormal processes and agencies possi¬ 
ble. Excessive national armaments will be limited by 
the voluntary act of each nation when it ceases to be for 
the self-interest of each nation to maintain an excessive 
armament. When an international organization, by its 
successful operation, has made some part of a nation’s 
armament unnecessary, and therefore excessive, the na¬ 
tion will, as a matter of common sense and economic 
necessity, scrap the part which is excessive and release 
the capital and labor for productive employment. Lim¬ 
itation of national armament in any other manner is, it 
would seem, impossible. In this manner it may be 
possible. 

That some such international conciliative directorate 
as has been suggested, exercising legislative and admin¬ 
istrative as well as judicial direction of the nations as 
respects international matters, must sooner or later be 
established, would seem to be beyond doubt. Destructive 
inventions have made the strong nations and the weak 
nations almost equally strong and equally defenseless. 
Constructive inventions have enabled all men and na¬ 
tions to share equally in the common necessities of life 
and in the common knowledge. All the races of men 
are rapidly becoming equal in physique and intelligence 
and equally cognizant of their fundamental rights. 

The proper time to begin the institution of the new 
system would seem to be the present moment. The ques¬ 
tions of national existence and boundaries, which are 
now the obstacles to peace, are almost entirely questions 
incidental to the rival ambitions of great powers. As 
things now are, small nations occupying strategic posi¬ 
tions on international trade routes cannot be allowed in¬ 
dependent existence within boundaries determined by 
the principles of nationality and equality of national 
right and opportunity. These small nations must, under 


AND ADMINISTRATION 


19 


the present system, be given such boundaries and allowed 
such privileges as are consistent with the political and 
economic policies of the nation or group of nations 
which for the moment holds the balance of power and 
dominates the particular international trade routes on 
which these small nations are situated. So long as there 
is no international direction to modify and gradually to 
supplant the present system of the balance of power, that 
system will remain, involving all the great powers in the 
struggle for world power, and leaving the small and 
strategically important nations in a condition of per¬ 
petual uncertainty as respects their boundaries, their 
privileges, and even their national existence. A conclu¬ 
sion of the war which should determine, according to 
the exigencies of the balance of power, the relations of 
the great powers to each other and the privileges and 
boundaries of smaller nations, would greatly complicate 
the future. Such a peace, as laying the foundation for 
a greater war in the future, might prove a worse calam¬ 
ity than the war itself. The most certain assurance 
against a peace of this kind would seem to be a unani¬ 
mous agreement between the great powers, entered into 
during the war, accepting the principle of an interna¬ 
tional conciliative direction after the war. 

Once such an agreement were signed, it would be pos¬ 
sible for the great powers, in the treaty of peace, with 
safety to each and all and without loss of dignity to any, 
to adjust properly the relations of each to the other and 
to determine scientifically and fairly the questions con¬ 
cerning the existence, rights and boundaries of the 
smaller nations and the claims of the nationalities which 
are aspiring to nationhood. A treaty of peace so made 
would form a sound basis for the future orderly and 
peaceful cooperative development of all nations, and 
would greatly simplify the work of the international 
directorate which would be formally instituted after 
the war through a constitutional convention of all na¬ 
tions. 


* 





APPENDIX 


Containing Documents Referred to 
in the Text. 



I 



APPENDIX A. 


THE CONVENTION FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT 
OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES, 

Adopted by the First Hague Conference. Signed July 29,1899. 

His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia; 
His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., 
and Apostolic King of Hungary; His Majesty the King of the 
Belgians; His Majesty the Emperor of China; His Majesty 
the King of Denmark; His Majesty the King of Spain, and in 
His Name Her Majesty the Queen Regent of the Kingdom; 
the President of the United States of America; the President 
of the United Mexican States ; the President of the French 
Republic; Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India; His Majesty 
the King of the Hellenes; His Majesty the King of Italy ; His 
Majesty the Emperor of Japan; His Royal Highness the 
Grand Duke of Luxemburg, Duke of Nassau; His Highness 
the Prince of Montenegro; Her Majesty the Queen of the 
Netherlands; His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia; His 
Majesty the King of Portugal and of the Algarves, etc.; His 
Majesty the King of Roumania; His Majesty the Emperor of 
all the Russias; His Majesty the King of Servia; His 
Majesty the King of Siam; His Majesty the King of Sweden 
and Norway; the Swiss Federal Council; His Majesty the 
Emperor of the Ottomans, and His Royal Highness the 
Prince of Bulgaria. 

Animated by a strong desire to concert for the mainte¬ 
nance of the general peace; 

Resolved to second by their best efforts the friendly settle¬ 
ment of international disputes; 

Recognizing the solidarity which unites the members of 
the society of civilized nations; 

Desirous of extending the empire of law and of strength¬ 
ening the appreciation of international justice; 

Convinced that the permanent institution of a Court of 
Arbitration, accessible to all, in the midst of the independent 
powers, will contribute effectively to this result; 

Having regard to the advantages attending the general 
and regular organization of arbitral procedure; 

Sharing the opinion of the august initiator of the Inter¬ 
national Peace Conference that it is expedient to record in 
an international agreement the principles of equity and 
right on which are based the security of States and the wel¬ 
fare of peoples; 

Being desirous of concluding a Convention to this effect, 
have appointed as their plenipotentiaries, to-wlt: 

[Here follow^ the names of plenipotentiaries.] 

Who, after communication of their full powers, found in 
good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions: 

23 



24 


APPENDIX A. 


TITLE I.—ON THE MAINTENANCE OF THE GENERAL 

PEACE. 

Article 1. 

With a view to obviating, as far as possible, recourse to 
force in the relations between States, the signatory Powers 
agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settle¬ 
ment of international differences. 


TITLE II.—ON GOOD OFFICES AND MEDIATION. 

Article 2. 

In case of serious disagreement or conflict, before an ap¬ 
peal to arms, the signatory Powers agree to have recourse, 
as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or media¬ 
tion of one or more friendly Powers. 

Article 3. 

Independently of this recourse, the signatory Powers rec¬ 
ommend that one or more Powers, strangers to the dispute, 
should, on their own initiative, and as far as circumstances 
may allow, offer their good offices or mediation to the States 
at variance. 

Powers, strangers to the dispute, have the right to offer 
good offices or mediation, even during the course of hostili¬ 
ties. 

The exercise of this right can never be regarded by one or 
the other of the parties in conflict as an unfriendly act. 

Article 4. 

The part of the mediator consists in reconciling the oppos¬ 
ing claims and appeasing the feelings of resentment which 
may have arisen between the States at variance. 

Article 5. 

The functions of the mediator are at an end when once 
it is declared, either by one of the parties to the dispute, or 
by the mediator himself, that the means of reconciliation 
proposed by him are not accepted. 

Article 6. 

Good offices and mediation, either at the request of the 
parties at variance, or on the initiative of Powers strangers 
to the dispute, have exclusively the character of advice and 
never have binding force. 


APPENDIX A. 


25 


Article 7. 

The acceptance of mediation cannot, unless there be an 
agreement to the contrary, have the effect of interrupting, 
delaying, or hindering mobilization or other measures of 
preparation for war. 

If mediation occurs after the commencement of hostilities 
it causes no interruption to the military operations in prog¬ 
ress, unless there be an agreement to the contrary. 

Article 8. 

The signatory Powers are agreed in recommending the 
application, when circumstances allow, of special mediation 
in the following form: 

In case of a serious difference endangering the peace, the 
States at variance choose respectively a Power, to whom 
they intrust, the mission of entering into direct communica¬ 
tion with the Power chosen on the other side, with the 
object of preventing the rupture of pacific relations. 

For the period of this mandate, the term of which, unless 
otherwise stipulated, cannot exceed thirty days, the States 
in conflict cease from all direct communication on the sub¬ 
ject of the dispute, which is regarded as referred exclu¬ 
sively to the mediating Powers, who must use their best 
efforts to settle it. 

In case of a definite rupture of pacific relations, these 
Powers are charged with the joint task of taking advantage 
of any opportunity to restore peace. 


TITLE III.—ON INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS OF 

INQUIRY. 

Article 0. 

In differences of an international nature involving neither 
honor nor vital interests, and arising from a difference of 
opinion on points of fact, the signatory Powers recommend 
that the parties, who have not been able to come to an agree¬ 
ment by means of diplomacy, should as far as circumstances 
allow, institute an international commission of inquiry, to 
facilitate a solution of these differences by elucidating the 
facts by means of an impartial and conscientious investiga¬ 
tion. 

Article 10. 

The international commissions of inquiry are constituted 
by special agreement between the parties in conflict. 

* The convention for an inquiry defines the facts to be ex¬ 
amined and the extent of the commissioners’ powers. 

It settles the procedure. 

On the inquiry both sides must be heard. 

The form and the periods to be observed, if not stated in 
the inquiry convention, are decided by the commission itself. 


26 


APPENDIX A. 


Article 11. 

The international commissions of inquiry are formed, un¬ 
less otherwise stipulated, in the manner fixed by Article 32 
of the present convention. 

Article 12. 

The Powers in dispute engage to supply the international 
commission of inquiry, as fully as they may think possible, 
with all means and facilities necessary to enable it to be 
completely acquainted with and to accurately understand 
the facts in question. 

Article 13. 

The international commission of inquiry communicates its 
report to the conflicting Powers, signed by all the members 
of the commission. 

Article 14. 

The report of the international commission of inquiry is 
limited to a statement of facts, and has in no way the char¬ 
acter of an arbitral award. It leaves the conflicting Powers 
entire freedom as to the effect to be given to this statement. 


TITLE IV.—ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION. 

CHAPTER I.-ON THE SYSTEM OF ARBITRATION. 

Article 15. 

International arbitration has for its object the settlement 
of differences between States by judges of their own choice, 
and on the basis of respect for law. 

Article 16. 

In questions of a legal nature, and especially in the inter¬ 
pretation or application of international conventions, arbi 
tratioh is recognized by the signatory Powers as the most 
effective, and at the same time the most equitable, means of 
settling disputes which diplomacy has failed to settle. 

Article 17. 

The arbitration convention is concluded for questions 
already existing or for questions which may arise event¬ 
ually. 

It may embrace any dispute or only disputes of a certain 
category. 


APPENDIX A. 


27 


Article 18. 

The arbitration convention implies the engagement to sub¬ 
mit loyally to the award. 

Article 19. 

Independently of general or private treaties expressly 
stipulating recourse to arbitration as obligatory on the sig¬ 
natory Powers, these Powers reserve to themselves the right 
of concluding, either before the ratification of the present 
Act or later, new agreements, general or private, with a view 
to extending obligatory arbitration to all cases which they 
may consider it possible to submit to it. 


CHAPTER II.—ON THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION. 

Article 20. 

With the object of facilitating an immediate recourse to 
arbitration for international differences, which it has not 
been possible to settle by diplomacy, the signatory Powers 
undertake to organize a Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
accessible at all times and operating, unless otherwise stip¬ 
ulated by the parties, in accordance with the rules of proce¬ 
dure inserted in the present Convention. 

Article 21. 

The Permanent Court shall be competent for all arbitra¬ 
tion cases, unless the parties agree to institute a special 

tribunal. 

Article 22. 

An International Bureau, established at The Hague, serves 
as record office for the Court. 

This Bureau is the channel for communications relative 
to the meetings of the Court. 

It has the custody of the archives and conducts all the 
administrative business. 

The signatory Powers undertake to communicate to the 
International Bureau at The Hague a duly certified copy of 
any conditions of arbitration arrived at between them, and 
of any award concerning them delivered by special tribunals. 

They undertake also to communicate to the Bureau the 
laws, regulations, and documents eventually showing the 
execution of the awards given by the Court. 

Article 23. 

Within the three months following its ratification of the 
present Act, each signatory Power shall select four persons 
at the most, of known competency in questions of interna¬ 
tional law, of the highest moral reputation, and disposed to 
accept the duties of arbitrators. 


28 


APPENDIX A. 


The persons thus selected shall be inscribed, as members 
of the Court, in a list which shall be notified by the Bureau 
to all the signatory Powers. 

Any alteration in the list of arbitrators is brought by the 
Bureau to the knowledge of the signatory Powers. 

Two or more Powers may agree on the selection in com¬ 
mon of one or more members. 

The same person can. be selected by different Powers. 

The members of the Court are appointed for a term of six 
years. Their appointments can be renewed. 

In case of the death or retirement of a member of the 
Court, his place shall be tilled in accordance with the method 
of his appointment. 

Article 24. 

When the signatory Powers desire to have recourse to the 
Permanent Court for the settlement of a difference that has 
arisen between them, the arbitrators called upon to form 
the competent tribunal to decide this difference must be 
chosen from the general list of members of the Court. 

Failing the direct agreement of the parties on the composi¬ 
tion of the arbitration tribunal, the following course shall 
be pursued: 

Each party appoints two arbitrators, and these together 
choose an umpire. 

If the votes are equal, the choice of the umpire is in¬ 
trusted to a third Power, selected by the parties by common 
accord. 

If an agreement is not arrived at on this subject, each 
party selects a different Power, and the choice of the umpire 
is made in concert by the Powers thus selected. 

The tribunal being thus composed, the parties notify to the 
Bureau their determination to have recourse to the Court 
and the names of the arbitrators. 

The tribunal of arbitration assembles on the date fixed by 
the parties. 

The members of the Court, in the discharge of their duties 
and out of their own country enjoy diplomatic privileges and 
immunities. 

Article 25. 

The tribunal of arbitration has its ordinary seat at The 
Hague. 

Except in cases of necessity, the place of session can only 
be altered by the tribunal with the assent of the parties. 

Article 26. 

The International Bureau at The Hague is authorized to 
place its premises and its staff at the disposal of the signa¬ 
tory Powers for the operations of any special board of arbi¬ 
tration. 

The jurisdiction of the Permanent Court may, within the 
conditions laid down in the regulations, be extended to dis¬ 
putes between non-signatory Powers, or .between signatory 
Powers and non-signatory Powers, if the parties are agreed 
on recourse to this tribunal. 


APPENDIX A. 


29 


Article 27. 

The signatory Powers consider it their duty, if a serious 
dispute threatens to break out between two or more of 
them, to remind these latter that the Permanent Court is 
open to them. 

Consequently, they declare that the fact of reminding the 
conflicting parties of the provisions of the present Conven¬ 
tion, and the advice given to them, in the highest interests 
of peace, to have recourse to the Permanent Court, can only 
be regarded as friendly actions. 

Article 28. 

A Permanent Administrative Council, composed of the 
diplomatic representatives of the signatory Powers accred¬ 
ited to The Hague and of the Netherland Minister for For¬ 
eign Affairs, who will act as president, shall be instituted 
in this town as soon as possible after the ratification of the 
present Act by at least nine Powers. 

This Council will be charged with the establishment and 
organization of the International Bureau, which will be 
under its direction and control. 

It will notify to the Powers the constitution of the Court, 
and will provide for its installation. 

It will settle its rules of procedure and all other necessary 
regulations. 

It will decide ail questions of administration which may 
arise with regard to the operations of the Court. 

It will have entire control over the appointment, suspen¬ 
sion, or dismissal of the officials and employes of the Bu¬ 
reau. 

It will fix the payments and salaries, and control the gen¬ 
eral expenditure. 

At meetings duly summoned the presence of five members 
is sufficient to render valid the discussions of the Council. 
The decisions are taken by a majority of votes. 

The Council communicates to the signatory Powers with¬ 
out delay the regulations adopted by it. It furnishes them 
with an annual report on the labors of the Court, the work¬ 
ing of the administration, and the expenses. 

Article 29. 

The expenses of the Bureau shall be borne by the signa¬ 
tory Powers in the proportion fixed for the International 
Bureau of the Universal Postal Union. 


CHAPTER TIT.—ON ARBITRAL PROCEDURE. 

Article 30. 

With a view to encourage the development of arbitration, 
the signatory Powers have agreed on the following rules 
which shall be applicable to arbitral procedure, unless other 
rules bare been agreed on by the parties; 


/ 


30 


APPENDIX A. 


Article 31. 

The Powers who have recourse to arbitration, sign a spe¬ 
cial act (compromis ), in which the subject of the difference 
is clearly defined, as well as the extent of the arbitrators’ 
powers. This act implies the undertaking of the parties to 
submit loyally to the award. 

Article 32. 

The duties of arbitrator may be conferred on one arbi¬ 
trator alone or on several arbitrators selected by the parties 
as they please, or chosen by them from the members of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration established by the present 
Act. 

Failing the constitution of the tribunal by direct agree¬ 
ment between the parties, the following course shall be pur¬ 
sued : 

Each party appoints two arbitrators, and these latter 
together choose an umpire. 

In case of equal voting, the choice of the umpire is in¬ 
trusted to a third Power, selected by the parties by common 
accord. 

If no agreement is arrived at on this subject, each party 
selects a different Power, and the choice of the umpire is 
made in concert by the Powers thus selected. 

Article 33. 

When a sovereign or the chief of a State is chosen as 
arbitrator, the arbitral procedure is settled by him. 

Article 34. 

The umpire is by right president of the tribunal. 

When the tribunal does not include an umpire, it appoints 
It's own president. 

Article 35. 

In case of the death, retirement, or disability from any 
cause of one of the arbitrators, his place shall be filled in 
accordance with the method of his appointment. 

Article 36. 

The tribunal’s place of session is selected bv the parties. 
Failing this selection, the tribunal sits at The Hague. 

The place thus fixed cannot, except in case of necessity, 
be changed by the tribunal without the assent of the parties. 

Article 37. 

The parties have the right to appoint delegates or special 
agents to attend the tribunal, for the purpose of serving as 
intermediaries between them and the tribunal. 

They are further authorized to retain, for the defense of 
their rights and interests before the tribunal, counsel or 
advocates appointed by them for this purpose. 


APPENDIX A. 


31 


Article 38. 

The tribunal decides on the choice of languages to be 
used by itself, and to be authorized for use before it. 

Article 39. 

As a general rule the arbitral procedure comprises two 
distinct phases: preliminary examination and discussion. 

Preliminary examination consists in the communication by 
the respective agents to the members of the tribunal and to 
the opposite party of all printed or written acts and of all 
documents containing the arguments invoked in the case. 
This communication shall be made in the form and within 
the periods fixed by the tribunal in accordance with Ar¬ 
ticle 49. 

Discussion consists in the oral development before the 
tribunal of the arguments of the parties. 

Article 40. 

Every document produced by one party must be communi¬ 
cated to the other party. 

Article 41. 

The discussions are under the direction of the president. 

They are only public if it be so decided by the tribunal, 
with the assent of the parties. 

They are recorded in the proces-verbaux drawn up by the 
secretaries appointed by the president. These procds-ver- 
baux alone have an authentic character. 

Article 42. 

When the preliminary examination is concluded, the tri¬ 
bunal has the right to refuse discussion of all fresh acts or 
documents which one party may desire to submit to it with¬ 
out the consent of the other party. 

Article 43. 

The tribunal is free to take into consideration fresh acts 
or documents to which its attention may be drawn by the 
agents or counsel of the parties. 

in this case, the tribunal has the right to require the pro¬ 
duction of these acts or documents, but is obliged to make 
them known to the opposite party. 

Article 44. 

The tribunal can, besides, require from the agents of the 
parties the production of all acts, and can demand all nec¬ 
essary explanations. In case of refusal, the tribunal takes 

note of it. 

Article 45. 

The . agents and-counsel of the parties are authorized to 
present orally to the tribunal all the arguments they may- 
think expedient in defense of their ca^e. * ' • ••“ ,? •' 


APPENDIX A. 


32 


Article 46. 

They have the right to raise objections and points. The 
decisions of the tribunal on those points are final, and can¬ 
not form the subject of any subsequent discussion. 

Article 47. 

The members of the tribunal have the right to put ques¬ 
tions to the agents and counsel of the parties, and to de¬ 
mand explanations from them on doubtful points. 

Neither the questions put nor the remarks made by mem¬ 
bers of the tribunal during the discussions can be regarded 
as an expression of opinion by the tribunal in general, or by 
its members in particular. 

Article 48. 

The tribunal is authorized to declare its competence in 
interpreting the compromis as well as the other treaties 
which may be invoked in the case, and in applying the prin¬ 
ciples of international law. 

Article 40. 

The tribunal has the right to issue rules of procedure for 
the conduct of the case, to decide the forms and periods 
within which each party must conclude its arguments, and 
to arrange all the formalities required for dealing with the 
evidence. 

Article 50. 

When the agents and counsel of the parties have sub¬ 
mitted all explanations and evidence in support of their 
case, the president pronounces the discussion closed. 

Article 51. 

The deliberations of the tribunal take place in private. 
Every decision is taken by a majority of members of the 
tribunal. 

The refusal of a member to vote must be recorded in the 
proces-verbal. 

Article 52. 

The award, given by a majority of votes, is accompanied 
by a statement of reasons. It is drawn up in writing and 
signed by each member of the tribunal. 

Those members who are in the minority may record their 
dissent when signing. 

Article 53. 

The award "is read out at a public meeting of the tribunal, 
the agents and counsel of the parties being present, or duly 
summoned to attend. 

Article 54. 

The award, duly pronounced and notified to the agents of 
the parties at variance, puts an end to the dispute defini¬ 
tively and without appeal. 


APPENDIX A. 


33 


Article 55. 

The parties can reserve in the compromis the right to de¬ 
mand the revision of the award. 

In this case, and unless there be an agreement to the con¬ 
trary, the demand must be addressed to the tribunal which 
pronounced the award. It can only be made on the ground 
of the discovery of some new fact calculated to exercise a 
decisive influence on the award, and which, at the time the 
discussion was closed, was unknown to the tribunal and to 
the party demanding the revision. 

Proceedings for revision can only be instituted by a de¬ 
cision of the tribunal expressly recording the existence of 
the new fact, recognizing in it the character described in 
the foregoing paragraph, and declaring the demand admissi¬ 
ble on this ground. 

The compromis fixes the period within which the demand 
for revision must be made. 

Article 56. 

The award is only binding on the parties who concluded 
the compromis. 

When there is a question of interpreting a Convention to 
which Powers other than those concerned in the dispute are 
parties, the latter notify to the former the compromis they 
have concluded. Each of these Powers has the right to in¬ 
tervene in the case. If one or more of them avail them¬ 
selves of this right, the interpretation contained in the award 
is equally binding on them. 

Article 57. 

Each party pays its own expenses and an equal share of 
those of the tribunal. 


GENERAL PROVISIONS. 

Article 58. 

The present Convention shall be ratified as speedily as 
possible. 

The ratifications shall be deposited at The Hague. 

A procds-verbal shall be drawn up recording the receipt 
of each ratification, and a copy duly certified shall be sent, 
through the diplomatic channel, to all the Powers who were 
represented at the International Peace Conference at The 
Hague. 

Article 59. 

The non-signatory Powers who were represented at the 
International Peace Conference can adhere to the present 
Convention. For this purpose they must, make known their 
adhesion to the contracting Powers by a written notification 
addressed to the Netherland Government, and communicated 
by it to all the other contracting Powers. 


34 


APPENDIX A. 


Article 60. 

The conditions on which the Powers who were not repre¬ 
sented at the International Peace Conference can adhere to 
the present Convention shall form the subject of a subse¬ 
quent agreement among the contracting Powers.* 


*A protocol establishing, as regards the Powers unrepre¬ 
sented at the 1899 Conference, the mode of adhesion to this 
Convention, was signed at The Hague June 14, 1907, by repre¬ 
sentatives of all the Powers represented at the 1899 Confer¬ 
ence. This protocol was as follows: 

“The Powers which have ratified the Convention for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed at The 
Hague on July 29, 1899, desiring to enable the States that 
were not represented at the First Peace Conference, and were 
invited to the Second, to adhere to the aforesaid Convention; 
the undersigned delegates or diplomatic representatives of 
the above-mentioned powers, viz.: Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Denmark, Spain, the United States 
of America, the United States of Mexico, France, Great 
Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Nor¬ 
way, the Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Boumania, Bussia, 
Servia, Siam, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey, duly author¬ 
ized to that effect, have agreed that there shall be opened by 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, a procds- 
verbal of adhesions, that shall serve to receive and'record the 
said adhesions which shall immediately go into effect. 

“In witness whereof the present protocol was drawn up, in 
a single copy, which shall remain in deposit in the archives 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, and of 
which an authenticated copy shall be transmitted to each one 
of the signatory Powers. 

“Done at the Hague, June 14, 1907. 

“(Here follows signatures).” 

The procds-verbal of adhesion referred to in the above 
protocol was as follows: 

“There was signed in this city on June 14, 1907, a protocol 
establishing, in respect to the Powers unrepresented at the 
First Peace Conference which have been invited to the second, 
the mode of adhesion to the Convention for the Peaceful Set¬ 
tlement of International Disputes, signed at The Hague, July 
29, 1899. 

“Pursuant to the said protocol, the undersigned Minister of 
Foreign Affairs for Her Majesty the Queen of the Nether¬ 
lands, on this day opened the present procds-verbal intended 
to receive and furthermore to record, as they may be pre¬ 
sented, the adhesions of the aforesaid Convention. 

“Done at The Hague, on June 15, 1907, in a single copy, 
which shall remain in deposit in the archives of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and of which a duly certified copy shall be 
transmitted to each of the signatory Powers. 

“Van Tets van Goudriaan. 

“Successively adhered: Argentine Bepublic, Brazil, Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama. 
Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Bepublic, Venezuela, Uruguay, 
Salvador, and Ecuador,” 



APPENDIX A. 


35 


Article 61. 

In the event of one of the high contracting parties de¬ 
nouncing the present Convention, this denunciation would 
not take effect until a year after its notification made in 
writing to the Netherland Government, and by it communi¬ 
cated at once to all the other contracting Powers. 

This denunciation shall only affect the notifying Power. 

In faith of which the plenipotentiaries have signed the 
present Convention and affixed their seals to it. 

Done at The Hague, the 29th July, 1899, in a single copy, 
which shall remain in the archives of the Netherland Gov¬ 
ernment, and copies of it, duly certified, be sent through the 
diplomatic channel to the contracting Powers. 

[Here follow signatures.] 


RATIFICATIONS, ADHESIONS, AND RESERVATIONS.* 


The 1899 Convention was ratified by all the signatory 
Powers on the dates indicated: 


Austria-Hungary ... 

Belgium .. 

Bulgaria . 

China . 

Denmark . 

France . 

Germany. 

Great Britain. 

Greece . 

Italy ... 

Japan . 

Luxembourg . 

Mexico . 

Montenegro. 

Netherlands. 

Norway. 

Persia . 

Portugal . 

Roumania . 

Russia. 

Servia. 

Siam. 

Spain. 

Sweden and Norway 

Switzerland . 

Turkey . 

United States . 


.September 4, 1900 

.September 4, 1900 

.September 4, 1900 

.November 21, 1904 

.September 4, 1900 

.September 4, 1900 

.September 4, 1900 

.September 4, 1900 

.April 4, 1901 

.September 4, 1900 

.October 6, 1900 

.July 12, 1901 

.April 17, 1901 

.October 16, 1900 

..September 4, 1900 

(See Sweden and Norway.) 

.September 4, 1900 

.September 4, 1900 

.September 4, 1900 

.September 4, 1900 

.May 11, 1901 

.September 4, 1900 

.September 4, 1900 

.September 4, 1900 

.December 29, 1900 

.June 12, 1907 

..September 4, 1900 


* See “The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 
and 1907,” edited by James Brown, Scott, and published by 
the Carnegie Endowment for International. Peace. 






























36 


APPENDIX A. 


Adhesions: 


Argentine Republic. 

.June 

15, 

15, 

1907 

1907 



15, 

1907 

Chile . 


15, 

1907 

Colombia . 


15, 

1907 

Cnhn . 


15, 

1907 

Dominican Republic. 


15, 

3, 

1907 

1907 

Guatemala . 


15, 

1907 

Haiti . 


15, 

1907 



15, 

1907 

Panama . 


15, 

1907 

Paramia v . 


15, 

1907 

Peru ... 

.June 

15, 

1907 



20, 

1907 

TTmemav . 

.June 

17, 

1907 

Venezuela . 


15, 

1907 


Reservations:* 

Roumania 

Under the reservations formulated with respect to 
Articles 16, 17, and 19 of the present Convention 
(15, 16, and 18 of the project presented by the com¬ 
mittee on examination), and recorded in the procu¬ 
re rbal of the sitting of the Third Commission of 
July 20, 1899.t 


Extract from the proces-verbal: 

The Royal Government of Roumania being 
completely in favor of the principle of faculta¬ 
tive arbitration, of which it appreciates the 
great importance in international relations, 
nevertheless does not intend to undertake, by 
Article 15, an engagement to accept arbitration 
in every case there provided for, and it be¬ 
lieves it ought to form express reservations in 
that respect. 

It cannot therefore vote for this article, ex¬ 
cept under that reservation. 

The Royal Government of Roumania declares 
that it cannot adhere to Article 16 except with 
the express reservation, entered in the proces- 
verbal, that it has decided not to accept, in any 
case, an international arbitration for disagree¬ 
ments or disputes previous to the conclusion of 
the present Convention. 


* All these reservations were made at signature, 
f Reservations maintained'at ratification. 




















APPENDIX A. 


37 


The Royal Government of Roumania de¬ 
clares that in adhering to Article 18 of the Con¬ 
vention, it makes no engagement in regard to 
obligatory arbitration.* 

Servia 

Under the reservations recorded in the procds-verbal 
of the Third Commission of July 20, 1899. t 
Extract from the procds-verbal: 

In the name of the Royal Government of Ser¬ 
via, we have the honor to declare that our adop¬ 
tion of the principle of good offices and media¬ 
tion does not imply a recognition of the right 
of third States to use these means except with 
the extreme reserve which proceedings of this 
delicate nature require. 

We do not admit good offices and mediation 
except on condition that their character of 
purely friendly counsel is maintained fully and 
completely, and we never could accept them in 
forms and circumstances such as to impress 
upon them the character of intervention.^ 

Turkey 

Under reservation of the declaration made in the 
plenary sitting of the Conference of July 25, 1899. 
Extract from the proces-verbal: 

The Turkish delegation, considering that the 
work of this Conference has been a work of 
high loyalty and humanity, destined solely to 
assure general peace by safeguarding the inter¬ 
ests and the rights of each one, declares, in the 
name of its Government, that it adheres to the 
project just adopted, on the following condi¬ 
tions : 

1. It is formally understood that recourse to 
good offices and mediation, to commissions of 
inquiry and arbitration, is purely facultative, 
and could not in any case assume an obligatory 
character or degenerate into interventions; 

2. The Imperial Government itself will be 
the judge of the cases where its interests would 
permit it to admit these methods without its 
abstention or refusal to have recourse to them 
being considered by the signatory States as an 
unfriendly act. 

It goes without saying that in no case could 
the means in question be applied to questions 
concerning interior regulation.* 

* Declaration of Turkhan Pasha. Proces-verbaux, pt. 1, 
p. 70. This reservation does not appear in the instrument of 
ratification. 

t Reservations maintained at ratification. 

% Declaration of Mr. Miyatovitch. Proc&s-verbaux, pt. iv, 

p. 47. 



38 


APPENDIX A. 


United States 

Under reservation of the declaration made at the 
plenary sitting of the Conference on the 25th of 
July, 1899. f 

Extract from the proc&s-verbal: 

The delegation of the United States of Amer¬ 
ica on signing the Convention for the pacific 
settlement of international disputes, as pro¬ 
posed by the International Peace Conference, 
makes the following declaration: 

Nothing contained in this Convention shall 
be so construed as to require the United States 
of America to depart from its traditional policy 
of not intruding upon, interfering with, or en¬ 
tangling itself in the political questions or •pol¬ 
icy or internal administration of any foreign 
State; nor shall anything contained in the said 
Convention be construed to imply a'relinquish¬ 
ment by the United States of America of its 
traditional attitude toward purely American 
questions.! 


t Reservation maintained at ratification. 
t Procds-verbauoc, pt. 1, p. 69. Ge m p are the reservation e# 
the United States to- the 196? Convention, post, -p. -87-. 





APPENDIX B. 


THE DRAFT CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE CREA¬ 
TION OF A JUDICIAL ARBITRATION COURT, 

OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PERMANENT COURT 

OF ARBITRAL JUSTICE. 

(Extract from the Final Act of the Second Hague Confer¬ 
ence, signed October 18, 1907). 

The Conference recommends to the signatory Powers the 
adoption of the annexed draft Convention for the creation of 
a Judicial Arbitration Court, and the bringing it into force 
as soon as an agreement has been reached respecting the 
selection of the judges and the constitution of the Court. 

DRAFT CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE CREATION 
OF A JUDICIAL ARBITRATION COURT. 

PART I.—CONSTITUTION OF THE JUDICIAL ARBITRATION COURT. 

Article 1. 

With a vie^ to promoting the cause of arbitration, the 
contracting Powers agree to constitute, without altering the 
status of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, a Judicial 
Arbitration Court, of free and easy access, composed of 
judges representing the various juridical systems of the 
world, and capable of insuring continuity in jurisprudence 
of arbitration. 

Article 2. 

The Judicial Arbitration Court is composed of judges and 
deputy judges chosen from persons of the highest moral 
reputation, and all fulfilling conditions qualifying them, in 
their respective countries, to occupy high legal posts, or be 
jurists of recognized competence in matters of international 
law. 

The judges and deputy judges of the Court are appointed, 
as far as possible, from the members of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration. The appointment shall be made 
within the six months following the ratification of the pres¬ 
ent Convention. 

Article 3. 

The judges and deputy judges are appointed for a period 
of twelve years, counting from the date on which the ap¬ 
pointment is notified to the Administrative Council created 
by the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes. Their appointments can be renewed. 

Should a judge or deputy judge die or retire, the vacancy 
is filled in the manner in which his appointment was made. 
In this case, the appointment is made for a fresh period of 
twelve years. 


39 



40 


APPENDIX B. 


Article 4. 

The judges of the Judicial Arbitration Court are equal 
and rank according to the date on which their appointment 
was notified. The judge who is senior in point of age takes 
precedence when the date of notification is the same. 

The deputy judges are assimilated, in the exercise of their 
functions, with the judges. They rank, however, below the 
latter. 

Article 5. 

The judges enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities in 
the exercise of their functions outside their own country. 

Before taking their seat, the judges and deputy judges 
must, before the Administrative Council, swear or make a 
solemn affirmation to exercise their functions impartially 
and conscientiously. 

Article 6. 

The Court annually nominates three judges to form a 
special delegation and three more to replace them should 
the necessity arise. They may be reelected. They are bal¬ 
loted for. The persons who secure the largest number of 
votes are considered elected. The delegation itself elects its 
president, who, in default of a majority, is appointed by lot. 

A member of the delegation cannot exercise his duties 
when the Power which appointed him, or of which he is a 
national, is one of the parties. 

The members of the delegation are to conclude all mat¬ 
ters submitted to them, even if the period for which they 
have been appointed judges has expired. 

Article 7. 

A judge may not exercise his judicial functions in any 
case in which he has, in any way, whatever, taken part in 
the decision of a national tribunal, of a tribunal of arbitra¬ 
tion, or of a commission of inquiry, or has figured in the 
suit as counsel or advocate for one of the parties. 

A judge cannot act as agent or advocate before the Judi¬ 
cial Arbitration Court or the Permanent Court of Arbitra¬ 
tion, before a special tribunal of arbitration or a commis¬ 
sion of inquiry, nor act for one of the parties in any capacity 
whatsoever so long as his appointment lasts. 

Article 8. 

The Court elects its president and vice-president by an 
absolute majority of the votes cast. After two ballots, the 
election is made by a bare majority and, in case the votes 
are even, by lot. 

Article 9. 

The judges of the Judicial Arbitration Court receive an 
annual salary of 6,000 Netherland florins. This salary is 
paid at the end of each half-year, reckoned from the date 
on which the Court meets for the first time. 


appendix b. 


41 


In the exercise of their duties during the sessions or in 
the special cases covered by the present Convention, they re¬ 
ceive the sum of 100 florins per diem. They are further en¬ 
titled to receive a traveling allowance fixed in accordance 
with regulations existing in their own country. The pro¬ 
visions of the present paragraph are applicable also to a 
deputy judge when acting for a judge. 

These emoluments are included in the general expenses 
of the Court dealt with in Article 31, and are paid through 
the International Bureau created by the Convention for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. 

Article 10. 

The judges may not accept from their own Government or 
from that of any other Power any remuneration for services 
connected with their duties in their capacity of members of 
the Court. 

Article 11. 

The seat of the Judicial Court of Arbitration is at The 
Hague, and cannot be transferred, unless absolutely obliged 
by circumstances, elsewhere. 

The delegation may choose, with the assent of the parties 
concerned, another site for its meetings, if special circum¬ 
stances render such a step necessary. 

Article 12. 

The Administrative Council fulfills with regard to the 
Judicial Court of Arbitration the same functions as to the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration. 

Article 13. 

The International Bureau acts as registry to the Judicial 
Court of Arbitration, and must place its offices and staff at 
the disposal of the Court. It has charge of the archives and 
carries out the administrative work. 

The secretary general of the Bureau discharges the func¬ 
tions of registrar. 

The necessary secretaries to assist the registrar, trans¬ 
lators and shorthand writers are appointed and sworn in by 
the Court. 

Article 14. 

The Court meets in session once a year. The session 
opens the third Wednesday in June, and lasts until all the 
business on the- agenda has been transacted. 

The Court does not meet in session if the delegation con¬ 
siders that such meeting is unnecessary. However, when 
a Power is party in a case actually pending before the Court, 
the pleadings in which are closed, or about to be closed, it 
may insist that the session should be held. 

When necessary, the delegation may summon the Court in 
extraordinary session. 


42 


APPENDIX B. 


Article 15. 

A report of the doings of the Court shall be drawn up 
every year by the delegation. This report shall be forwarded 
to the contracting Powers through the International Bureau. 
It shall also be communicated to the judges and deputy 
judges of the Court. 

Article 16. 

The judges and deputy judges, members of the Judicial 
Arbitration Court, can also exercise the functions of judge 
and deputy judge in the International Prize Court. 

PART II.-COMPETENCY AND PROCEDURE. 

Article 17. 

The Judicial Court of Arbitration is competent to deal 
with all cases submitted to it, in virtue either of a general 
undertaking to have recourse to arbitration or of a special 
agreement. 

Article 18. 

The delegation is competent— 

1. To decide the arbitrations referred to in the preceding 
article, if the parties concerned are agreed that the sum¬ 
mary procedure, laid down in Part IV, Chapter IV, of the 
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Dis¬ 
putes is to be applied;* 

2. To hold an inquiry under and in accordance with Part 
III of the said Convention, in so far as the delegation is in¬ 
trusted with such inquiry by the parties acting in common 
agreement. With the assent of the parties concerned, and 
as an exception to Article 7, paragraph 1, the members of 
the delegation who have taken part in the inquiry may sit 
as judges, if the case in dispute is submitted to the arbitra¬ 
tion of the Court or of the delegation itself. 

Article 19. 

The delegation is also competent to settle the compromis 
referred to in Article 52 of the Convention for the Pacific 


* This refers to the Convention for the Pacific Settlement 
of International Disputes as amended by the Hague Confer¬ 
ence of 1907. The Convention in the form in which it was 
adopted by the Hague Conference of 1899 is given in this 
Appendix, inasmuch as the Convention as amended by the 
Hague Conference of 1907, has not yet been ratified by a 
majority of nations. By article 91 of the Convention as 
amended in 1907, it is provided: “The present Convention, 
duly ratified, shall replace, as between the contracting Powers, 
the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes of the 29th July, 1899. ? ’ It seems that the 1907 
Convention has not been ‘ ‘ duly ratified, ’ 1 and is therefore 
not in force. 



APPENDIX B. 


43 


Settlement of International Disputes if the parties are 
agreed to leave it to the Court.* 

It is equally competent to do so, even when the request 
is only made by one of the parties concerned, if all attempts 
have failed to reach an understanding through the diplo¬ 
matic channel, in the case of— 

1. A dispute covered by a general treaty of arbitration 
concluded or renewed after the present Convention has come 
into force, providing for a compromis in all disputes, and 
not either explicitly or implicitly excluding the settlement of 
the compromis from the competence of the delegation. Re¬ 
course cannot, however, be had to the Court if the other 
party declares that in its opinion the dispute does not belong 
to the category of questions to be submitted to compulsory 
arbitration, unless the treaty of arbitration confers upon the 
arbitration tribunal the power of deciding this preliminary 
question. 

2. A dispute arising from contract debts claimed from one 
Power by another Power as due to its nationals, and for the 
settlement of which the offer of arbitration has been ac¬ 
cepted. This arrangement is not applicable if acceptance is 
subject to the condition that the compromis should be set¬ 
tled in some other way. 

Article 20. 

Each of the parties concerned may nominate a judge of 
the Court to take part, with power to vote, in the examina¬ 
tion of the case submitted to the delegation. 

If the delegation acts as a commission of inquiry, this 
task may be intrusted to persons other than the judges of 
the Court. The traveling expenses and remuneration to be 
given to the said persons are fixed and borne by the Powers 
appointing them. 

Article 21. 

The contracting Powers only may have access to the 
Judicial Arbitration Court set up by the present Convention. 

Article 22. 

The Judicial Court of Arbitration follows the rules of 
procedure laid down in the Convention for the Pacific Set¬ 
tlement of International Disputes, except in so far as the 
procedure is laid down in the present Convention. 

Article 23. 

The Court determines what language it will itself use and 
what languages may be used before it. 


* This also refers to the Convention for the Pacific Settle¬ 
ment of International Disputes as amended by the Confer¬ 
ence of 1907. 



44 


APPENDIX B. 


Article 24. 

The International Bureau serves as channel for all com¬ 
munications to be made to the judges during the inter¬ 
change of pleadings provided for in Article 63, paragraph 2, 
of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes.* 

Article 25. 

For all notices to be served, in particular on the parties, 
witnesses, or experts, the Court may apply direct to the 
Government of the State on whose territory the service is 
to be carried out. The same rule applies in the case of 
steps being taken to procure evidence. 

The requests addressed for this purpose can only be re¬ 
jected when the Power applied to considers them likely to 
impair its sovereign rights or its safety. If the request is 
complied with, the fees charged must only comprise the ex¬ 
penses actually incurred. 

The Court is equally entitled to act through the Power on 
whose territory it sits. 

Notices to be given to parties in the place where the Court 
sits may be served through the International Bureau. 

Article 26. 

The discussions are under the control of the president or 
vice-president, or, in case they are absent or cannot act, of 
the senior judge present. 

The judge appointed by one of the parties cannot preside. 

Article 27. 

The Court considers its decisions in private, and the pro¬ 
ceedings are secret. 

All decisions are arrived at by a majority of the judges 
present. If the number of judges is even and equally 
divided, the vote of the junior judge, in the order of prece¬ 
dence laid down in Article 4, paragraph 1, is not counted. 

Article 28. 

The judgment of the Court must give the reasons on 
which it is based. It contains the names of the judges 
taking part in it; it is signed by the president and registrar. 

Article 29. 

Each party pays its own costs and an equal share of the 
costs of the trial. 

Article 30. 

The provisions of Articles 21 to 29 are applicable by anal¬ 
ogy to the procedure before the delegation/ 


* This refers to the 1907 Convention. 


< , t 
v* <■ 



APPENDIX B. 


45 


When the right of attaching a member to the delegation 
has been exercised by one of the parties only, the vote of 
the member attached is not recorded if the votes are evenly 

divided. 

Article 31. 

The general expenses of the Court are borne by the con¬ 
tracting Powers. 

The Administrative Council applies to the Powers to ob¬ 
tain the funds requisite for the working of the Court. 

Article 32. 

The Court itself draws up its own rules of procedure, 
which must be communicated to the contracting Powers. 

After the ratification of the present Convention the Court 
shall meet as early as possible in order to elaborate these 
rules, elect the president and vice-president, and appoint the 
members of the delegation. 

Article 33. 

The Court may propose modifications in the provisions of 
the present Convention concerning procedure. These pro¬ 
posals are communicated through the Netherlands Govern¬ 
ment to the contracting Powers, which will consider to¬ 
gether as to the measures to be taken. 

Article 34. 

The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as pos¬ 
sible. 

The ratifications shall be deposited at The Hague. 

A proces-verbal of the deposit of each ratification shall be 
drawn up, of which a duly certified copy shall be sent 
through the diplomatic channel to all the signatory Powers. 

■ f r <1 .. 

Article 35. 

The Convention shall come into force six months after its 
ratification. 

It shall remain in force for twelve years, and shall be 
tacitly renewed for periods of twelve years, unless de¬ 
nounced. 

The denunciation must be notified, at least two years be¬ 
fore the expiration of each period, to the Netherland Gov¬ 
ernment, which will inform the other Powers. 

The denunciation shall only have effect in regard to the 
notifying Power. The Convention shall continue in force 
as far as the other Powers are concerned. 


46 


APPENDIX B. 


SIGNATURES AND RESERVATIONS. 

The Final Act of the Second Hague Conference was signed 
by plenipotentiaries of the following nations: Argentine 
Republic, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bul¬ 
garia, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Monte¬ 
negro, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Persia, 
Peru, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Salvador, Servia, Siam, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United States, Uru¬ 
guay, and Venezuela. 

Switzerland, however, signed the Final Act under reserva¬ 
tion of the declaration concerning the Judicial Arbitration 
Court (Court of Arbitral Justice), “which the Swiss Federal 
Council does not accept.” 




APPENDIX C. 


A DECLARATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRIN¬ 
CIPLES OF HUMAN SOCIETY. 

(Extract from the Preamble of the Declaration of Independ¬ 
ence of the United States of America, 
dated July 4, 1776.) 

. We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all men are 
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, lib¬ 
erty, and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving 
their just powers from the consent of the governed. 


47 



APPENDIX D. 


A DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF 
NATIONS, ADOPTED BY THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, JANUARY 6, 1916, AND 
SUBSEQUENTLY ADOPTED AND PROMOTED BY 
THE AMERICAN PEACE SOCIETY. 

AVhereas the municipal law of civilized nations recognizes 
and protects the right to life, the right to liberty, the right 
to the pursuit of happiness, as added by the Declaration of 
Independence of the United States of America, the right to 
legal equality, the right to property, and the right to the 
enjoyment of the aforesaid rights; and 
Whereas these fundamental rights, thus universally recog¬ 
nized, create a duty on the part of the peoples of all nations 
to observe them ; and 

Whereas, according to the political philosophy of the Dec¬ 
laration of Independence of the United States and the uni¬ 
versal practice of the American Republics, nations or gov¬ 
ernments are regarded as created by the people, deriving 
their just powers from the consent of the governed, and are 
instituted among men to promote their safety and happiness 
and to secure to the people the enjoyment of their funda¬ 
mental rights; and 

Whereas the nation is a moral or juristic person, the 
creature of law and subordinated to law, as is the natural 
person in political society; and 

Whereas we deem that these fundamental rights can be 
stated in terms of international law and applied to the rela¬ 
tions of the members of the society of nations, one with an¬ 
other, just as they have been applied in the relations of the 
citizens or subjects of the States forming the society of 
nations; and 

Whereas these fundamental rights of national jurispru¬ 
dence, namely, the right to life, the right to liberty, the right 
to the pursuit of happiness, the right to equality before the 
law, the right to property, and the right to the observance 
thereof, are, when stated in terms of international law, the 
right of the nation to exist and to protect and to conserve its 
existence: the right of independence and the freedom to de¬ 
velop itself without interference or control from other na¬ 
tions ; the right of equality in law and before law; the right 
to territory within defined boundaries and to exclusive juris¬ 
diction therein, and the right to the observance of these 
fundamental rights; and 

Whereas the rights and the duties of nations are, by virtue 
of membership in the society thereof, to be exercised and 
performed in accordance with the exigencies of their mutual 
interdependence expressed in the preamble to the Conven¬ 
tion for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 

48 



APPENDIX D. 


49 


the First and Second Plague Peace Conferences, recognizing 
the solidarity which unites the members of the society of 
civilized nations; therefore the American Institute of Inter¬ 
national Law, at its first session, held in the city of Wash¬ 
ington, in the United States of America, on the sixth day of 
January, 1916, adopted the following six articles, together 
with the commentary thereon, to be known as its Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Nations: 

I. Every nation has the right to exist and to protect and 
to conserve its existence, but this right neither implies the 
right nor justifies the act of the State to protect itself or to 
conserve its existence by the commission of unlawful acts 
against innocent and unoffending States. 

II. Every nation has the right to independence in the 
sense that it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and is 
free to develop itself without interference or control from 
other States, provided that in so doing it does not interfere 
with or violate the rights of other States. 

III. Every nation is in law and before law the equal of 
every other nation belonging to the society of nations, and 
all nations have the right to claim and. according to the 
Declaration of Independence of the United States, “to as¬ 
sume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal 
station to which the laws of nature and of nature’s God 
entitle them.” 

IV. Every nation has the right to territory within de¬ 
fined boundaries and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over 
its territory and all persons, whether native or foreign, 
found therein. 

V. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations 
is entitled to have that right respected and protected by all 
other nations, for right and duty are correlative, and the 
right of one is the duty of all to observe. 

VI. International law is at one and the same time both 
national and international; national in the sense that it is 
the law of the land and applicable as such to the decision of 
all questions involving its principles; international in the 
sense that it is the law of the society of nations and appli¬ 
cable as such to all questions between and among the mem¬ 
bers of the society of nations involving its principles. 


APPENDIX E. 


A DECLARATION OF THE OBJECTS FOR WHICH THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WAS 
FORMED. 

(Preamble of the Constitution of the United States.) 

We, the people of the United States, in order to form a 
more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tran¬ 
quility, provide for the common defense, promote the gen¬ 
eral welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves 
and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution 
for the United States of America. 


56 



APPENDIX F. 


A UNIVERSAL BILL OF RIGHTS MADE BY SELECTING 

THE UNIVERSALLY APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF 

THE BILL OF RIGHTS CONTAINED IN THE CON¬ 
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 

(This universal bill of rights was first formulated in the 
Instructions of the United States Government to the Philip¬ 
pine Commission, dated April 7, 1900. It was approved by 
the Supreme Court of the United States as correctly stating 
the bill of rights by which the United States, from the mo¬ 
ment when the Philippines were annexed, was bound in its 
dealings with the people and governments of these islands. 
See Kepner vs. United States, 195 U. S., 100, 122, 123.) 

There are certain great principles of government which 
have been made the basis of our governmental system, which 
we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance 
of individual freedom. . . . There are also certain prac¬ 

tical rules of government which we have found essential to 
the preservation of these great principles of liberty and 
law. . . . These principles and these rules of govern¬ 

ment must be established and maintained in [the] islands 
for the sake of the liberty and happiness [of the people of 
the islands], however much they may conflict with the 
customs or laws or procedure with which they are familiar. 
. . . Upon every division and branch of the government 

of the Philippines, therefore, must be imposed these in¬ 
violable rules: 

That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or prop¬ 
erty without due process of law; that private property shall 
not be taken for public use without just compensation; that 
in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the wit¬ 
nesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtain¬ 
ing witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of 
counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be re¬ 
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in 
jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any crim¬ 
inal case to be a witness against himself; that the right to 
be secure against unreasonable searches or seizures shall 
not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servi¬ 
tude shall exist except as a punishment for crime; that no 
bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that 
no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or 
of the press or the rights of the people to peaceably assem¬ 
ble and petition the government for a redress of grievances; 
that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of 
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that 
the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and 
worship without discrimination or preference shall forever 
be allbwed. 


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